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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, a divided Supreme Court decided Till v. SCS Credit 
Corp.,1 mandating use of a “prime-plus” formula to determine the 
interest rate applicable to repayment over time of a secured creditor’s 
claim in a chapter 13 (consumer) bankruptcy. The “prime-plus” formula 
substantially reduced the amount repaid to secured creditors as 
compared to the interest rates that consumer credit usually entails. 
Subsequently, courts have interpreted dicta in Till’s plurality opinion to 
require use of the same “prime-plus” formula in chapter 11 (business) 
bankruptcies, in spite of a century or more of Supreme Court precedent 
developing the “absolute priority” doctrine, which has provided 
creditors with greater recoveries in corporate reorganizations. While the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
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plurality’s dicta undoubtedly put the matter of chapter 11 interest rates 
into play, a “deep dive” into the proceedings before the Till Court 
reveals that the field of chapter 11 jurisprudence was barely mentioned 
in the briefing, argument, or the Justices’ questions. This lack of judicial 
analysis throws into question the weight lower courts have uncritically 
accorded Till’s chapter 11 dicta. Further, when we contrast the relevant 
sections of chapter 13 and chapter 11 (a task surprisingly unperformed 
by the lower courts that have extended Till to the chapter 11 context), 
they prove far more dissimilar than those courts have assumed. The 
decisions extending Till’s consumer-protecting formula to business 
bankruptcies rest on a superficial deference to the plurality’s dicta that 
becomes untenable when measured against the full record of 
proceedings in Till and the relevant statutory language. 
Ultimately, we argue the Till “prime-plus” method for pricing 
interest rates in chapter 13 was endorsed by Till’s plurality solely as a 
pragmatic response to certain characteristics specific to chapter 13 that 
are not found in chapter 11. This conclusion enables Till to stand on its 
own as a chapter 13 pronouncement, while remaining harmonious with 
the long line of Supreme Court decisions in the business reorganization 
context that have provided secured creditors greater protection than the 
Tills’ lender received. 
Part I of this article contains a brief history of the Supreme Court’s 
development of the “fair and equitable” standard and the absolute 
priority doctrine in business reorganization. Part II provides an overview 
of cramdowns under the current Code as set forth in chapter 11 and 
chapter 13.2 Part III presents a “deep dive” into the Supreme Court 
proceedings in Till with a focus on the practical and fact-specific 
considerations that led to the fractured decision. Part IV reviews how 
lower courts are mistakenly applying Till in chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
Part V argues that Till has no place in chapter 11 cramdowns and that 
courts should instead revert to following the century’s worth of existing 
Supreme Court opinions and their progeny that specifically address 
treatment of creditors in chapter 11 cramdowns. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Confirmation standards under chapter 11 and chapter 13 require that either, (1) 
the court finds that all classes of creditors accept the plan, or (2) if an impaired class of 
creditors votes against the plan (and therefore is a “dissenting” class), the court find that 
the plan meets certain additional standards set forth in § 1129(b) or § 1325(a)(5). See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); 13 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). Confirmation over the objection of a 
dissenting class after those additional findings are made is called a “cramdown.” 
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I. PRE-CODE DEVELOPMENTS: THE “FAIR AND EQUITABLE” 
STANDARD AND THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the absolute priority 
doctrine over the past century. The doctrine is most famously associated 
with the Court’s 1913 decision in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 
which stated that a plan of reorganization may not provide value to 
shareholders until all creditors’ claims were first satisfied in full.3 But 
when it came to reorganization practice, Boyd was honored mostly in the 
breach,4 as business bankruptcies in that era tended instead to apportion 
debt reduction among the different layers of the businesses’ capital 
structure in a negotiated manner.5 The practice tended to favor 
stockholders (often managers of the business or prominent members of 
the local business community) to the detriment of the most senior 
creditors (often more distant investors who had purchased the 
company’s secured bonds as a source of steady income).6 The 
                                                                                                                 
 3. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (“If the value of the road 
justified the issuance of stock in exchange for old shares, the creditors were entitled to 
the benefit of that value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for 
purposes of control. In either event it was a right of property out of which the creditors 
were entitled to be paid before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose 
whatever.”). 
 4. See ARTHUR STONE DEWING, 2 THE FINANCING POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 
1303–04 (5th ed. 1953) (“In the twenty-five years following the Boyd case little was 
added to clarify the extent to which the absolute priority rights of creditors could be 
carried. . . . At all events reorganization plans gave lip service to the Boyd decision 
without weighing too nicely the value of shares of stock the entire worth of which 
rested on future undetermined earning power.”). 
 5. See id. at 1299–1300 (explaining that following the panic of 1893, the “relative 
priority” theory was employed, “[A] hierarchy of relative values was worked out in 
which creditors and stockholders were each called upon to make certain sacrifices, but 
after these had been exacted, the claim of each security-holder was given a place in the 
reorganization in the order of priority . . . . [N]o hard line of demarcation was drawn 
between bondholder and stockholder, each being regarded as a contributor to the 
railroad’s capital and therefore, in accordance with their relative priority, entitled to 
participate in the reorganization . . . . [T]he rigor of the bondholders’ lien on the 
corporate property was softened in order to justify the participation by the old 
stockholders in the securities of the new company.”). Id. The Boyd decision did not 
immediately alter this arrangement. See id. 
 6. John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 
969-71 (1989); see DEWING, supra note 4, at 1275 n.mmmm (“It has been long known 
that many reorganization committees of bankrupt real estate companies were little more 
than a racket. Field cites a case within his personal knowledge, of a real estate default—
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negotiation over the divvying up of debt reduction often led to 
protracted proceedings that struck observers as inefficient.7 Worst of all, 
as debt reduction was not an outcome that creditors embraced 
enthusiastically, the “relative priority” practice frequently left 
companies overly leveraged when they eventually did emerge, to the 
dismay of economic policy makers.8 
In 1934, Congress passed the nation’s first corporate reorganization 
statute, which codified the Boyd doctrine that a plan be “fair and 
equitable” prior to confirmation. Again, however, the edict did not 
adequately protect creditors in practice. As one contemporary scholar 
explained: 
[i]n many cases, it was charged, the committees or others 
purportedly representing the bondholders, general creditors and 
stockholders in the informal negotiations resulting in the final plan, 
were not actually effective and independent representatives of the 
interests they purported to serve. In some cases, . . . such committees 
or other representatives were in fact affiliated with or even 
designated by the old management or other “inside” interests, whose 
real purpose might be to perpetuate existing control and cover up 
possible past mismanagement.9 
In short, shareholders continued to retain value at the expense of 
creditors, even under the new reorganization statute.10 
                                                                                                                 
with a ‘committee’ organized by the managing owners—apparently for no other 
purpose than of defraud the individual bondholders.”); id. at 1275–81 and 
accompanying notes for examples illustrating the problem of committees, including that 
they often inadequately served their constituents. 
 7. See, e.g., John H. Crider, Court Ruling Seen Speeding 77B Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 1939, at 48; DEWING, supra note 4, at 1256, n.uu. 
 8. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and 
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 932-36 
(2001). 
 9. Emmet McCaffery, Corporate Reorganization Under the Chandler Bankruptcy 
Act, 26 CAL. L. REV. 643, 650 (1938). 
 10. See Perry Anderson, U.S. Supreme Court Rule of Valuation as Applied to 
Corporate Reorganization, 27 MARQ. L. REV. 111, 123 (1943) (“The principle of 
absolute priority has recently been restated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Case v. 
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. The absolute priority rule had earlier been stated in 
the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Northern Pacific R.R. v. Boyd but so many 
reorganizations later followed the rule of relative priority that it became necessary to 
clarify and state definitely the rule to be followed in reorganizations.”) (citation 
omitted). 
898 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
The very next year, a Supreme Court dominated by New Deal era 
reformers, urged on by fellow reformer Solicitor General Robert 
Jackson on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, seized upon a small, largely 
consensual Chapter X reorganization to torpedo these practices.11 The 
resultant opinion in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 
reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that “fair and equitable” requires 
faithful adherence to the absolute priority doctrine.12 Justice Douglas 
wrote: 
“fair and equitable” . . . are words of art which prior to the advent of 
section 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial 
interpretations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations. 
Hence, as in the case of other terms or phrases used in that      
section . . . we adhere to the familiar rule that where words are 
employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in 
the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires the 
contrary.13 
The court thus confirmed that “fair and equitable” is a term of art 
with a fixed meaning. 
In Los Angeles Lumber, the Court rejected the assertion that it was 
“fair and equitable” to make secured bondholders share with equity 
interests the going concern premium, even though the premium would 
have been lost in a liquidation but was preserved by the cooperation of 
equity interests in reorganization.14 The Court explained that liquidation 
was not the only alternative, because the court could have approved a 
going concern reorganization that delivered all the ownership to the 
secured creditors.15 Therefore, the equity interests were entitled to 
nothing in exchange for filing a voluntary petition for reorganization 
rather than being forced into an involuntary liquidation.16 On remand, 
the District Court approved a modified plan that delivered all the value 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Crider, supra note 7, at 48. 
 12. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 13. L.A. Lumber, 308 U.S. at 115 (citing Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434,    
446 (1899)). 
 14. Id. at 124. 
 15. Id. at 131. 
 16. Id. 
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of the business to the secured creditors and wiped out the equity’s 
stake.17 
Two years later, in Consolidated Rock Products v. Du Bois, the 
Supreme Court again overturned a confirmed plan because it failed the 
“fair and equitable” standard in its treatment of creditors.18 In another 
opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that the plan “comes within 
judicial denunciation because it does not recognize the creditors’ 
‘equitable right to be preferred to stockholders against the full value of 
all property belonging to the debtor corporation.’”19 The Court further 
opined that 
[T]he bondholders have not been made whole. They have received 
an inferior grade of securities, inferior in the sense that the interest 
rate has been reduced, a contingent return has been substituted for a 
fixed one, the maturities have been in part extended and in part 
eliminated by the substitution of preferred stock, and their former 
strategic position has been weakened. Those lost rights are of value. 
Full compensatory provision must be made for the entire bundle of 
rights which the creditors surrender.20 
This passage illustrates the Supreme Court’s settled view that a 
creditor’s “entire bundle of rights” merit protecting, and, where junior 
interests participate in a reorganization, senior creditors must be “made 
whole” for the plan to satisfy the “fair and equitable” standard.21 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 carried the “fair and 
equitable” language into the modern era with procedural modification 
that resulted in what is known as a “relaxed” version of the absolute 
priority standard.22 Under the current Code, if a class of creditors 
accepts the reorganization plan, the class’s treatment under the plan will 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See DEWING, supra note 4, at 1309, n.o (“Following the Supreme Court 
decision the district judge approved an ‘absolute priority’ reorganization in which all 
the issued stock was given to the bondholders—all the previous stockholders were 
eliminated.”). 
 18. Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). 
 19. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citing Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union 
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454 (1926)). 
 20. Id. at 527–28 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207 (1988) (stating 
that “the Code provides that a “fair and equitable” reorganization plan is one which 
complies with the absolute priority rule”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
900 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
not be scrutinized by the “fair and equitable” standard.23 If, however, 
that class of creditors dissents, then the plan proponent must show that 
its proposed treatment of the class satisfies the “fair and equitable” 
standard for the plan to be confirmed.24 This “encourages a negotiated 
restructuring and eliminates the necessity of establishing the going 
concern value of a company in every case,”25 but it also protects the 
interests of a dissenting class of creditors from inequitable treatment vis-
à-vis the interests of creditors junior to it. 
Congress reformed the Code with no intention of severing the 
incorporated phrase “fair and equitable” from the meaning given it by 
cases like Boyd and Los Angeles Lumber.26 Contemporaneous 
statements by participants in the reform underscore the view that section 
1129 cramdown standards were reformed to protect secured creditor 
interests. Kenneth Klee, the House Judiciary Committee staffer most 
involved in drafting the Code (including chapter 11 and chapter 13)27 
stated that the new Code would afford additional “protection for secured 
claims that is not provided under present law,”28 and Ronald Trost, a 
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference who was deeply 
involved in the 1970s reform project, wrote: “In the usual chapter 11 
case either secured creditors will consent to the plan or the business will 
not be able to be reorganized.”29 The intent of the reform, then, was 
certainly not to weaken recoveries by chapter 11 secured creditors. 
                                                                                                                 
 23. If no class dissents, the plan must satisfy only the conditions set forth in 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(1)–(16). 
 24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
 25. MICHAEL A. GERBER, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 734, 744 (2d. ed. 2000). 
 26. See H.R. REP NO. 95-595 at 413 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6369 (explaining that subsection (b) “requires simply that the plan meet certain 
standards of fairness to dissenting creditors or equity security holders. The general 
principle of the subsection permits confirmation notwithstanding nonacceptance by an 
impaired class if that class and all below it in priority are treated according to the 
absolute priority rule. . . . That is, if the class is impaired, then they must be paid in full 
or, if paid less than in full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan. 
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class on down.”). 
 27. Kenneth Klee was one of the principal draftsmen of the Code. J. Ronald Trost, 
Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 BUS. 
LAW 1309, 1309 n.* (1979). 
 28. See Kenneth Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the 
New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 143 (1979). 
 29. See Trost, supra note 27, at 1335 n.182. 
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II. THE CURRENT CODE AND POST-CODE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. CRAMDOWN UNDER SECTION 1129 
The text of Section 1129(b)(1) of the Code states that where there is 
a dissenting class, the plan must be “fair and equitable, with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not 
accepted, the plan.”30 Section 1129(b)(2) thereafter lists three separate 
tests to assist in determining whether a plan is “fair and equitable” to 
dissenting classes: one each for classes of secured claims, unsecured 
claims, and equity interests.31 
The test for secured claims set forth in Section 1129(b)(2)(A) 
contains three disjunctive criteria for the plan to be “fair and equitable” 
with respect to a dissenting class of secured claims. The criterion 
relevant to this article is the first, which permits confirmation so long as 
the secured claimholder retains its lien and receives deferred cash 
payments that are (1) equal to at least the allowed amount of the claim 
and (2) have “a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the 
value of such holder’s interest” in the collateral securing the claim 
(hereinafter referred to as the “deferred payments” condition).32 There is 
little question that the language “value, as of the effective date of the 
plan” equates to the present value of the sum in question.33 This latter 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). With respect to a class of unsecured claims, 
the plan must provide: (i) “that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on 
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to 
the allowed amount of such claim” or (ii) “the holder of any claim or interest that is 
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of 
such junior claim or interest any property . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). Similarly, 
with respect to a class of equity interests, the plan must provide: (i) “that each holder of 
an interest of such class receive or retain on account of such interest property of a value, 
as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any 
fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price 
to which such holder is entitled, or the value of such interest; or (ii) the holder of any 
interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not receive or retain under the 
plan on account of such junior interest any property.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C); see 
Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why it Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 1, 14 (2003). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 408, 413, 414 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 6364, 6369, 6370. 
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requirement, then, calls for calculation of the present value of the 
deferred payments as of the effective date of the plan and a 
determination that such value is at least equal to the value of the secured 
claim (hereinafter referred to as the “chapter 11 present value test”). 
Within this statutory scheme, various factors affect the value of 
deferred cash payments. In particular, the discount rate applies when 
calculating the present value of the payments.34 Typically, in chapter 11 
cramdowns, experts offer evidence of current market conditions. They 
will also value the enterprise as a going concern and, if necessary, value 
the proposed repayment so the court can decide whether, in light of the 
current market, the treatment of the class is “fair and equitable.” Each of 
these factors impacts the ultimate value of the repayments to be made, 
and therefore the value of the recovery of secured creditors, which is 
used to determine compliance with the absolute priority doctrine. 
In the more than 35 years since the Bankruptcy Code was adopted, 
the Supreme Court has confirmed in no uncertain terms that the absolute 
priority rule “gained express statutory force, and was incorporated into 
Chapter 11 . . . .”35 Moreover, the Court has continued its practice of 
applying the rule strictly. In Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 
decided in 1988, the Court held that the absolute priority doctrine is 
violated even where debtors retain otherwise “worthless” equity 
interests over the objection of an impaired class.36 The Court stated that 
“the Code provides that it is up to the creditors—and not the courts—to 
accept or reject a reorganization plan which fails to provide them 
                                                                                                                 
‘Value as of the effective date of the plan,’ as used in paragraph (3) 
and in proposed 11 U.S.C. § 1179(a)(7)(B) [sic], 1129(a)(9), 
1129(b), 1172(2) [sic], 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5)(B), and 1328(b), 
indicated that the promised payment under the plan must be 
discounted to present value as of the effective date of the plan. The 
discounting should be based only on the unpaid balance of the 
amount due under the plan, until that amount, including interest, is 
paid in full. Id. at 6364. 
 34. See Maloy, supra note 32, at 21–25. 
 35. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) (“Under 
current law, no Chapter 11 reorganization plan can be confirmed over the creditors’ 
legitimate objections (absent certain conditions not relevant here) if it fails to comply 
with the absolute priority rule.”). 
 36. Id. at 208 (reasoning that “there may still be some value in the control of the 
enterprise . . .”). 
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adequate protection or fails to honor the absolute priority rule.”37 The 
Court later cited this language in Bank of America National Trust & 
Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, decided in 
1999.38 There, the Court held that prepetition owners may not cram 
down a plan that allows only those owners to contribute new capital in 
exchange for equity in the reorganized debtor where the dissenting class 
of creditors was not paid in full.39 In 203 North LaSalle, the Court 
further communicated a preference for market valuations rather than 
judicial ones. It opined that Congress intended to “narrow the occasions 
for courts to make valuation judgments” and implied a “disfavor for 
decisions untested by competitive choice” under section 
1129(b)(2)(B),40 which governs the cramdown of unsecured claims. A 
test by the market—specifically, by giving creditors the right to 
participate through submitting bids or proposing competing plans—
satisfies the absolute priority rule by ensuring that “top dollar” is paid.41 
Thus, less than five years prior to deciding the Tills’ consumer 
bankruptcy case, the Court was firmly wedded to maintaining the 
absolute priority rule in chapter 11 cases. 
B. CRAMDOWN UNDER SECTION 1325 
In order for a plan to be confirmed under chapter 13, it must 
comply with general confirmation requirements similar to those in 
chapter 11. Such requirements, like section 1129, include a court finding 
that either (1) all classes of creditors have accepted the plan or (2) if a 
class dissents, the plan satisfies specific criteria. In the case of a secured 
creditor, those criteria are that the plan must provide that either (1) the 
debtor surrenders the collateral to the claimholder or (2) the claimholder 
retains its lien and “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of 
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not 
less than the allowed amount of such claim.”42 Thus, cramdown in 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 207. 
 38. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 457 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 437. 
 40. Id. at 457–58. The Court held that promoting market valuations is in the 
interest of “statutory coherence” with other sections of the Code; specifically, it renders 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) consistent with the “supramajoritarian class creditor voting scheme” of 
§ 1126(c). Id. 
 41. Id. at 457. 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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chapter 13 requires a “present value” test (hereinafter referred to as the 
“chapter 13 present value test”) that is facially similar to the chapter 11 
present value test.43 However, section 1325(a)(5) makes no reference to 
the “fair and equitable” requirement, a distinction that has gone largely 
unrecognized by courts considering the relevance of Till to chapter 11 
cases, as we discuss further in Part IV. 
Before Till was decided, the circuit courts adopted various methods 
of calculating the discount rate applicable to the chapter 13 present 
value test. These methods included the “coerced loan” approach44 
(adoption of market rates for similar loans); the “presumptive contract 
rate” approach45 (adoption of the prepetition contract rate as a 
presumption that either party may refute with evidence); “the cost of 
funds” approach46 (adoption of the rate that it would cost the lender to 
obtain an equal amount of money, i.e., the lender’s cost of funds); and 
various formula approaches47 (adoption of a relatively riskless rate—like 
the US Treasury rate—and the addition of a risk premium, such as for 
default risk). In 2004, the Supreme Court’s decision in Till eliminated 
the debate over interest rates in chapter 13 cramdown fights and 
mandated use of the “prime-plus” method, a formula approach involving 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Section 1325 differs in requiring (1) assessment of the value of the “property” 
to be distributed, whereas § 1129 specifically requires “deferred payments,” and (2) the 
present value of the property be “not less than” the “allowed amount of the claim,” 
whereas § 1129 requires that the present value of the deferred payments be “at least” 
the value of the collateral securing the claim. Compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). Further, the tests are not identical in practice because experts are 
not typically retained in chapter 13 bankruptcies given the small sums at stake. 
 44. Six circuits adopted variations of the “coerced loan” approach. See, e.g., In re 
Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 
F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1993); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993); In 
re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925 (6th 
Cir. 1989); In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 45. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit 
Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (holding the original contract rate should serve as the 
“presumptive rate” for cramdown). 
 46. Id. at 593 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
 47. Three circuits adopted alternative “formula” methods for discounting payments 
to present value. See In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by 
Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (holding chapter 13 cramdown 
interest should be fixed at the treasury bond rate plus a 1-3% risk premium); In re 
Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving formula approach for chapter 12 
cramdown); United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989) (endorsing 
formula approach in determining chapter 12 cramdown interest). 
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adoption of the prime rate plus a risk variable that typically is, but need 
not be, within the range of one to three percent.48 
III. A “DEEP DIVE” INTO TILL v. SCS CREDIT CORP. 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The bankruptcy case of Lee and Amy Till was in most respects an 
ordinary consumer bankruptcy. In 1998, Instant Auto Finance, a 
subprime auto lender, financed the Tills’ purchase of a used 1991 
Chevrolet pickup truck at a 21% annual interest rate,49 the maximum 
rate chargeable under Indiana’s usury law.50 The loan was for $6,426, 
and the bimonthly payments were to be $122.51 In 1999, the Tills, who 
had reduced the principal by about 25% but were in default, filed for 
chapter 13 relief in bankruptcy court for the Southern District of 
Indiana.52 The parties stipulated to a $4,000 secured claim for the 
lender.53 
The Tills’ plan proposed to repay the secured claim in full over 17 
months at a 9.5% interest rate at a time when the “prime” rate was 
around 8%.54 The 1.5% premium was set by local rule (a fact not 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Till, 541 U.S. at 466 (“The risk adjustment’s proper scale is not before this 
Court. The Bankruptcy Court approved 1.5% in this case, and other courts have 
generally approved 1% to 3%.”). 
 49. Brief for Respondent at 1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003 WL 
22466039. 
 50. Id. at 31 (citing Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-3-201). 
 51. Till, 541 U.S. at 470 (“Petitioners’ initial indebtedness amounted to $8,285.24–
the $6,425.75 balance of the truck purchase plus a finance charge of 21% per year for 
136 weeks, or $1,859.49. Under the contract, petitioners agreed to make 68 biweekly 
payments to cover this debt . . . .”). 
 52. See Brief for Respondent, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); Brief for 
Petitioners at 3, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). The lender also received an $895 
deficiency claim which was not satisfied in full. See id. This is worth keeping in mind 
to the extent one wants to think about whether the Tills’ plan was “fair” or “equitable” 
in a broad sense, especially when advocates of greater debtor relief emphasize the 21% 
pre-petition interest rate and the supposed profit reaped by the lender. The lender here 
was not paid in full on its total claim. 
 53. Till, 541 U.S. at 470. 
 54. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); Brief for 
Respondent at 5, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
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disclosed in any of the Court’s opinions).55 The lender voted to reject the 
proposed treatment and, at the confirmation hearing, showed through 
two fact witnesses that (1) it “uniformly” charged a 21% interest rate on 
loans of similar credit quality and purpose and (2) such a rate was the 
prevailing industry rate for car loans to creditors like the Tills56 (none of 
which was surprising given that 21% was the usury ceiling57). 
The Tills responded with expert testimony to the effect that a fair 
market price of capital and the time value of money were captured by 
the prime rate of 8% interest, and a 1.5% risk premium should be added 
to cover the risk that petitioners would not make payments as required 
by the plan.58 The resultant 9.5% rate dovetailed with the rate 
established by local rule. The expert asserted that this 9.5% formula rate 
was “very reasonable” given that chapter 13 plans are “supposed to be 
financially feasible” and opined that respondent’s exposure was fairly 
limited because chapter 13 plans are performed “under the supervision 
of the court.”59 The chapter 13 trustee filed comments supporting the 
formula rate as, “among other things, easily ascertainable, closely tied to 
the ‘condition of the financial market,’ and independent of the financial 
circumstances of any particular lender.”60 The bankruptcy judge allowed 
the debtors’ expert’s testimony, adopted his reasoning, and confirmed 
the plan in an unreported opinion in June 2000.61 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003 
WL 22955931. This is surprising given that the plurality would go on to declare that the 
“prime-plus” approach provided room for individualized risk assessment. 
 56. Till, 541 U.S. at 471. 
 57. Brief for Respondent at 31, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (citing Ind. Code 
Ann. § 24-4.5-3-201). 
 58. The expert was an Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
economics professor who “acknowledged that he had only limited familiarity with the 
subprime auto lending market.” Till, 541 U.S. at 471. Paying an academic expert to 
deliver expert testimony is unusual in Chapter 13, especially where the amount in 
controversy is less than $1,000. Here, the UAW was representing the Tills and bore the 
cost of the expert outside of the estate. Correspondence between Annette Rush, attorney 
for United Auto Worker Legal Services Plan, and Mark J. Thompson (Jan. 6, 2014) (on 
file with authors). On a $4,000 note over 17 months, the 11.5% difference in interest 
rates amounted to about $600 in additional payments. 
 59. Till, 541 U.S. at 471–72. 
 60. Id. at 472 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-42a). 
 61. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016); see Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at Appendix D, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
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The lender appealed to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana, which reversed on the grounds that 
unrebutted evidence established that a subprime market existed with 
rates of 21%, and therefore the contract rate should be utilized.62 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in August 2002, by 2 to 1, but did so 
on different grounds than the opinion below.63 Its opinion echoed the 
district court in reasoning that a secured creditor “is entitled to the rate 
of interest it could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the 
proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk” to a similarly situated 
debtor since nothing less would give the creditor the “indubitable 
equivalent” of its nonbankruptcy entitlement.64 However, the Seventh 
Circuit went further, announcing that the pre-petition non-default 
contract rate was presumptive evidence of the correct rate,65 thus 
endorsing the “presumptive contract rate” approach. The lone dissenter 
advocated reimbursing the lender only for its “cost of funds,” an 
approach she touted as “closer to recognizing the economic 
consequences of the debtor’s decision to keep the collateral.”66 After 
denying writs of certiorari in similar disputes, the Supreme Court chose 
Till as the vehicle to resolve the circuit split. 
Ultimately, in Till, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
decision below, endorsing the formula approach and ordering 
application of the “prime-plus” method. It rejected the presumptive 
contract rate approach in a 5-4 decision that comprised three camps. A 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). The District Court 
considered this to answer the controlling inquiry under Koopmans v. Farm Credit 
Servs. Of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 1996). See also In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 586 
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Till, 541 U.S. 465. The Seventh Circuit explained that 
its decision in Koopmans stood for the proposition that “the creditor must get the 
market rate of interest, at the time of the hypothetical foreclosure, for loans of 
equivalent duration and risk.” In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591 (quoting Koopmans, 102 F.3d 
at 875). 
 63. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 593. 
 64. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591-92. 
 65. See id. at 592 (stating that the “old contract rate will yield a rate sufficiently 
reflective of the value of the collateral at the time of the effectiveness of the plan to 
serve as a presumptive rate”) (adopting the reasoning of General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1993) and In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 66. Id. at 595 (Rovner, J., dissenting). This analysis is neither legally sound nor 
accurately reflects the basic principles of finance in a market economy. The fact that a 
risk has materialized has nothing to do with whether the government can coercively re-
expose the lender to a renewal of that risk or a different one, or at what price. 
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plurality, supporting the “prime-plus” method, narrowly prevailed in an 
opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Breyer, 
Ginsberg, and Souter. Justice Thomas authored a separate concurrence 
that advocated use of the risk-free rate because it is “[t]he interest rate 
most closely approximating the riskless or pure rate for money.”67 
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Rehnquist joined a dissent written by 
Justice Scalia that argued for use of the “presumptive contract” rate, a 
variation of the “coerced loan” approach.68 The lack of a clear majority 
view suggests the Till prime-plus method should have had weak 
precedential effect, especially outside of chapter 13 cramdowns, but this 
has not been the case.69 
B. THE TILL DICTA 
The plurality included two dicta that, some argue, bear on the 
chapter 11 present value test. First, the Till plurality stated: “We think it 
likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow 
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate 
under any of these provisions.”70 This “same approach” dictum was 
followed by the comment that Congress would favor an approach 
“familiar in the financial community” and that “minimizes the need for 
expensive evidentiary proceedings.” The comment was the first in a list 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Till, 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68. See id. at 490–508 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. It bears noting that eight of the nine justices did agree that the rate should be 
higher than the prime rate (the plurality having endorsed the prime-plus approach and 
the dissent having endorsed the coerced loan approach). See also Daniel R. Wong, Note 
and Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract Rate 
Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1945 (2012) (citing Till, 541 U.S. at 477). Wong 
opines that “[t]he narrowest interpretation [of the holding of Till] is that the Supreme 
Court did not endorse the coerced loan approach for Chapter 13 debtors.” Id. Where no 
single rationale explains the decision of the majority of the court, “the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (Stewart, Powell & 
Stevens, JJ., plurality). In Till, a majority of the justices (the plurality and Justice 
Thomas) agreed to reject of the presumptive contract rate approach in the Chapter 13 
case before them, but only four of the nine justices (the plurality) endorsed the prime-
plus approach as an alternative. 
 70. Till, 541 U.S. at 474, 474 n.10 (referencing 11 U. S. C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) 
(2012), which requires payment of property with a “value, as of the effective date of the 
plan” equals or exceeds the value of the creditor’s claim, and other related sections). 
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of three considerations said to govern how to choose an interest rate 
“sufficient to compensate the creditor” for concerns that accompany 
future payments under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).71 The second 
consideration in the list was that “Chapter 13 expressly authorizes a 
bankruptcy court to modify the rights of any creditor whose claim is 
secured by an interest in anything other than real property that is the 
debtor’s principal residence.”72 The third was that the calculation should 
be “objective” rather than subjective “from the point of view of the 
creditor.”73 
In its discussion of this third point regarding the need for an 
“objective” calculation method, the plurality opinion included a 
footnote, “Footnote 14,” that stated: “when picking a cramdown rate in a 
chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market 
would produce.”74 Footnote 14 made this assertion after explaining that 
“there is no free market of willing cram down lenders” (presumably, in 
chapter 13 bankruptcies).75 Contrasting this observation with its 
perception of chapter 11 practice, the court noted that, in chapter 11, 
there exist lender advertisements offering debtor-in-possession financing 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 473-74. 
 72. Id. at 475 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)). 
 73. Id. at 476. 
 74. Id. at 476 n.14. The full text of Footnote 14 is as follows: 
This fact helps to explain why there is no readily apparent Chapter 
13 “cram down market rate of interest”: Because every cramdown 
loan is imposed by a court over the objection of the secured creditor, 
there is no free market of willing cramdown lenders. Interestingly, 
the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous lenders 
advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession. See, e.g., 
Balmoral Financial Corporation, http://www.balmoral.com/bdip.htm 
(all Internet materials as visited Mar. 4, 2004, and available in Clerk 
of Court’s case file) (advertising debtor in possession lending); 
Debtor in Possession Financing: 1st National Assistance Finance 
Association DIP Division, http://www.loanmallusa.com/dip.htm 
(offering “to tailor a financing program . . . to your business needs 
and . . . to work closely with your bankruptcy counsel). Thus, when 
picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense 
to ask what rate an efficient market would produce. In the Chapter 
13 context, by contrast, the absence of any such market obligates 
courts to look to first principles and ask only what rate will fairly 
compensate a creditor for its exposure. 
 75. Id. 
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to debtors.76 After making the key assertion that looking to market rates 
might make sense in a chapter 11 case, the plurality concluded the 
footnote by contrasting chapter 13, in which “the absence of any such 
market obligates courts to look to first principles and ask only what rate 
will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”77 Both Till dicta—the 
“same approach” remark and Footnote 14—have influenced cramdowns 
outside of the chapter 13 consumer context, as discussed in Part IV. 
C. TILL: A PRAGMATIC CHAPTER 13 DECISION 
Till was a chapter 13 bankruptcy case that was likely unintended to 
overrule the Court’s past century of precedent upholding the application 
of the absolute priority doctrine in business reorganizations, from Boyd 
to 203 North LaSalle, none of which received a mention in the 
plurality’s opinion. This reading of the case is supported by a close 
review not only of the opinion, but also the briefs submitted to and 
arguments before the Court. First, there was negligible consideration, in 
either briefing or oral argument, of chapter 11 statutory parallels to 
chapter 13 cramdown issues. Second, significant portions of the briefing 
and oral argument centered on an issue specific to consumer bankruptcy 
cases—subprime lending—which has little bearing on chapter 11 
business reorganizations. Finally, the Court, as evidenced at oral 
argument, was focused predominantly on the administrative concern of 
how the various present value calculation methods would operate in 
practice in the chapter 13 environment without any regard for the 
implications of such methods in chapter 11. These factors suggest that 
Till’s dicta should not be afforded significant weight outside of chapter 
13 cases. 
1. Negligible Consideration of Chapter 11 Statutory Parallels 
In their submissions to the Supreme Court, the parties’ arguments 
dwelled on the pragmatic aspects of chapter 13 cases. The debtors’ 
briefing barely discussed the language of the Bankruptcy Code or pre-
Code law. The debtors contrasted chapters 11 and 13 only once, in a 
footnote in their reply brief highlighting only differences between the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. (as opposed to exit financing, which is more akin to chapter 11 cramdown 
payments). 
 77. Id. 
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two chapters. They argued that the “complexity of assets” and “variety 
of risks” typical of chapter 11 bankruptcies “make the present value 
analysis as part of the ‘fair and equitable’ standard under Chapter 11 a 
complex endeavor beyond the scope of consumer chapter 13.”78 The rest 
of the debtors’ brief underscored chapter 13’s purpose and how chapter 
13 operates in practice. 
The lender’s brief devoted less than three pages to business 
reorganization parallels.79 It argued that Congress intended for section 
1325 to be construed within the confines of the “indubitable 
equivalence” standard of In re Murel Holding Co., a business 
reorganization case.80 However, the lender failed to provide authority for 
that thesis, and it did not address the critical textual distinction81 
between sections 1129 and 1325 that plainly contradicts the lender’s 
argument.82 In contrast (and correctly83), the amicus brief for the United 
States, submitted by the Solicitor General, highlighted some of the 
textual differences between the cramdown provisions in chapters 11 and 
13. Notably, the Solicitor General emphasized that the “indubitable 
equivalence” standard does not appear in section 1325.84 The brief 
stated: 
The statutory term “indubitable equivalent,” however, 
appears only in two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
neither of which applies here. See 11 U.S.C. 361(3) . . . 
11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (prescribing an “indubitable 
equivalent” standard as an alternative to cram down in 
Chapter 11 proceedings) . . . . Disputes over present 
value and discount rates concern how courts should 
calculate that equivalence. Language quoted from 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1 n.1, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
 79. See Brief for Respondent at 41–43, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
 80. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1941). 
 81. See infra Part V.A. 
 82. Brief for Respondent at 41–43, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (citing only to 
authority treating chapter 11 and failing to rationalize its extension of the “indubitable 
equivalence” concept to chapter 13 cases). Lender also spent most of its brief on topics 
other than language, arguing principally that market rates and contract rates are the best 
evidence of risk, and discounting to present value should be done on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
 83. See infra Part V.A. 
 84. Brief for the United States at 18, n.9, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016), 2003 
WL 22070345. 
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Sections 361(3) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) does not in any 
way answer that question.85 
In short, the Solicitor General made the point that chapter 11 
standards do not necessarily inform chapter 13 cramdowns. 
Consistent with the parties’ and Solicitor General’s briefs, the oral 
argument gave minimal consideration to chapter 11 cramdown 
principles as authorities (or even as analogies) for interpreting section 
1325(a)(5)(B). The Court’s interrogation of the Tills’ counsel centered 
on chapter 13 debtors’ risks of default, including statistics relating to 
such defaults and means of calculating a risk premium. During argument 
by lender’s counsel, Justice Breyer brushed aside discussion of 
“indubitable equivalence”86 and changed the focus of the argument to 
the “practical question” before the Court. Likewise, when lender’s 
counsel compared how interest rates are generated in chapter 11 and 13 
cases, attempting to answer the question of the best evidence of a market 
rate, Justice Breyer dismissively retorted, “Tell me . . . a question I don’t 
know the answer to”87 and again redirected the discussion to a practical 
concern: what would happen if a chapter 13 debtor defaulted under the 
plan. In her rebuttal, counsel for the Tills closed her oral argument with 
the succinct statement that “indubitable equivalence is not a chapter 13 
concept.”88 Overall, oral argument focused on the practical challenges of 
determining a rate in a chapter 13 case rather than on concepts like 
“indubitable equivalence” and “fair and equitable,” which are integral to 
chapter 11 cramdowns. Mirroring this concentration on chapter 13 
practicalities rather than on chapter 11 standards, the plurality opinion 
did not conduct an in-depth review of case law or the statutory text, as 
might be expected in a litigation turning on statutory interpretation. The 
business reorganization standard invoked by the lender—”indubitable 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 18 n.9 (emphasis added). Although the paragraph begins as a response to 
the lender’s invocation of “indubitable equivalence,” the 1129 reference that closes the 
point is not to the clause that contains the phrase “indubitable equivalence” (clause (iii)) 
but to the “deferred cash payment” test two clauses earlier in the statute. 
 86. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016) (stating 
that “nobody is disagreeing” that the concept of indubitable equivalence is 
compensatory). 
 87. Id. at 41–42. 
 88. Id. at 55. 
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equivalence”—was not mentioned at all in any of the opinions issued by 
the Supreme Court.89 
2. Focus on Subprime Lending in Chapter 13 
A second issue emphasized in the briefing and argument was 
subprime auto lending, the challenges of which are only relevant to 
consumer credit.90 The debtors’ brief emphasized the supposedly 
egregious pricing practices associated with subprime auto loans,91 a 
subset of subprime consumer lending wherein interest rates are often 
capped by state usury laws. Usury rates tend not to fluctuate with the 
market. They are maximum rates that a lender may charge a consumer 
borrower, who typically has weak bargaining power or choice of 
financing packages.92 
The inflexibility of the usury rate was a key issue during oral 
argument. Justice Breyer seemed especially perturbed. He expressed 
concern that a “presumptive contract rate” approach would not adjust to 
match changes in credit market rates that were relevant to a present 
value computation. He observed that interest rates had fallen in the years 
between the Tills’ truck purchase and confirmation of their plan, but the 
contract rate approach would not pass the benefit of that reduction 
through to the Tills nor adjust their interest rate to reflect the presumed 
rehabilitation of their finances in chapter 13.93 The lender’s counsel 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See Till, 541 U.S. 465. 
 90. Subprime lending is “extending consumer credit to individuals with incomplete 
or somewhat tarnished credit records who often are unable to obtain traditional 
financing.” Joseph A. Smith, Jr., ‘The Federal Banking Agencies’ Guidance on 
Subprime Lending: Regulation with A Divided Mind,” 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 76 
(2002). 
 91. The brief included a description of subprime auto lending, stating “the higher 
interest rates charged by subprime lenders cannot be fully explained solely as a function 
of the ‘additional risks’ presented by these loans.” See Brief for Petitioners at 17, Till, 
541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
 92. See Smith, supra note 90, at 76, for general discussions of subprime lending. 
Such characteristics make the subprime borrower susceptible to exploitation by lenders. 
The Solicitor General’s brief communicated a disdain for “eye-popping” interest rates. 
Brief for the United States at 6, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). This sentiment was 
echoed by the plurality. Till, 541 U.S. at 480-81. 
 93. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-
1016). Justice Breyer questioning, in relevant part: 
 
MR. BRUNSTAD: Your Honor, the contract rate is the best 
evidence, the single best evidence of the market rate. 
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explained that the market rate was capped by state usury law.94 The 
plurality, of which Justice Breyer was a member, wound up presenting 
the “prime-plus” formula approach as a self-adjusting “market” 
approach in contrast to the contract rate presumption. The plurality 
favored the “prime-plus” rate because it “depends only on the state of 
financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the 
characteristics of the loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its 
prior interactions with the debtor.”95 At the same time, the plurality 
conceptualized the subprime contract market as inappropriately rigid, 
opining that “several considerations suggest that the subprime market is 
not, in fact, perfectly competitive.”96 
                                                                                                                 
QUESTION: Contract rate—if there has to be a number that’s 
wrong, it has to be that one. . . . The contract rate by definition was 
entered into at some significant period of time prior to the present, 
and the present, by chance in this instance, is 2 years later, and we 
know that interest rates fell at least 1 or 2 percent during that time. 
MR. BRUNSTAD: But not for subprime— 
QUESTION: So—what? 
MR. BRUNSTAD: But not for subprime loans. 
QUESTION: That’s impossible. The prime rate— 
MR. BRUNSTAD: No, Your Honor. This is why. 
QUESTION: If that’s so, then the risk went up. 
MR. BRUNSTAD: No, that’s not correct, Your Honor, and this is 
why. 
QUESTION: No. It isn’t? 
MR. BRUNSTAD: Because State law caps the maximum rate that 
can be paid. 
QUESTION: Oh, okay. . . . All right, because it’s a usury problem. 
MR. BRUNSTAD: Correct. 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Till, 541 U.S., at 466. 
 96. Id. at 481-82 (stating that “several considerations suggest that the subprime 
market is not, in fact, perfectly competitive. To begin with, used vehicles are regularly 
sold by means of tie-in transactions, in which the price of the vehicle is the subject of 
negotiation, while the terms of the financing are dictated by the seller. In addition, there 
is extensive federal and state regulation of subprime lending, which not only itself 
distorts the market, but also evinces regulators’ belief that unregulated subprime lenders 
would exploit borrowers’ ignorance and charge rates above what a competitive market 
would allow.”). 
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3. Focus on Ease of Administration of Chapter 13 Cases 
Oral argument addressed ease of administration more than any 
other topic. A traditional examination of statutory text and case law 
precedents was conspicuously absent. Early in the oral argument, Justice 
Kennedy described the coerced loan theory as “hard to administer” and 
questioned whether the “prime-plus” approach might present a similar 
challenge.97 The justices repeatedly asked counsel—and each other—
one practical question: whether it made more sense to calculate the 
cramdown rate by starting with a floor, like the prime rate, and work 
upward for increased risk, or by starting with the contract rate, which 
presumably reflects risk, and adjusting downward to reflect the 
supposed benefits to lenders of chapter 13 administration (such as the 
presence of a plan trustee and court supervision of plan performance). 
When the Solicitor General was questioned about the wisdom of starting 
with the prime rate and working up from it, he countered with the 
observation that in this case the search is for an easily calculable proxy 
rather than a perfect rate, explaining that “there is no rate you can find 
that—that precisely reflects the unique mix of risks and benefits and 
protections that are available under the Bankruptcy Code. And so by 
definition, everyone here is talking about a proxy in some form or 
another.”98 Justice Scalia, who authored the dissent, epitomized the 
focus of the debate on practical concerns by asking during argument, “Is 
it possible that the statute does not provide an answer to this question? 
That since both of these schemes, your proposal and the other side’s 
proposal, are theoretically perfect, if they are done correctly, the 
bankruptcy court is free to use either one so long as he comes up with 
the right answer . . . . I think what we’re trying to get to—it’s a practical 
question.”99 While Justice Scalia elicited laughter from the gallery by 
suggesting that perhaps “the statute does not provide an answer to this 
question,”100 the plurality opinion admitted the point: “[t]he Bankruptcy 
Code provides little guidance . . .” as to which method to choose.101 
The Justices directed the balance of their questions toward other 
practical concerns specific to chapter 13 cases. Justice Ginsburg 
highlighted these by noting that “[m]ost of these debtors are very small 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
 98. Id. at 22. 
 99. Id. at 38–40 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 38–39. 
 101. Till, 541 U.S. at 473. 
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debtors.”102 She noted that, under such circumstances, starting with the 
contract rate as a presumptive rate and requiring the debtor to argue for 
downward adjustments to offset factors like the high replacement cost of 
collateral, compensation for risk embedded in the contract rate, and the 
transaction cost saved would be too burdensome on an individual 
debtor. 103 She went on to explain that, 
. . . the debtor has no money at all and certainly you don’t want the 
debtor’s money eaten up hiring an attorney and further depleting the 
money that could go to the creditors. So it seems to me wildly 
unrealistic to expect that if you say the presumptive price is the 
contract price, you’re going to get a debtor who will be able to—I 
mean, I was surprised, looking at this record, that this debtor got an 
expert. Who paid the expert? Maybe because the union was involved 
. . . isn’t it typical that these chapter 13 debtors don’t have lawyers 
and don’t have experts?104 
Her question evidenced a concern that typical chapter 13 debtors 
cannot afford to pay experts, so a calculation method that required one 
would render proceedings increasingly complicated and prohibitively 
expensive for chapter 13 debtors. Similarly, the Court asked lender’s 
counsel about the advantages of chapter 13 to the creditor,105 the 
difficulties of administration,106 and the attendant costs, like the need to 
hire a lawyer to pursue a defaulting chapter 13 debtor in court.107 
This focus on the practicalities of administering a chapter 13 
bankruptcy and the specifics of the Tills’ situation carried through to the 
plurality opinion. The Court rejected the “coerced loan” approach for 
reasons of administration and practicality that are specific to chapter 13, 
not because the text of the Code prohibits it. As the Court noted, “the 
coerced loan approach requires bankruptcy courts to consider evidence 
about the market for comparable loans to similar (though nonbankrupt) 
debtors, an inquiry far removed from such courts’ usual task of 
evaluating debtors’ financial circumstances and the feasibility of their 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 48–49. 
 105. Id. at 37 (such as the existence of a wage order and replacement value as 
opposed to foreclosure value due to Rash). 
 106. Id. at 47. 
 107. Id. at 42–43. 
2015] LOST IN TRANSLATION 917 
debt adjustment plans.”108 This rationale is inapplicable to a chapter 11 
context where courts necessarily and routinely receive expert testimony 
concerning financial markets in valuing the debtor’s business or related 
valuation questions. The plurality also charged—regrettably, without 
further explanation or any citations—that the “coerced loan” approach 
“overcompensates creditors because the market lending rate must be 
high enough to cover factors, like lenders’ transaction costs and overall 
profits, that are no longer relevant in the context of court-administered 
and court-supervised cram down loans.”109 This reason for rejecting the 
“coerced loan” approach is inapplicable to the chapter 11 context, 
where, after the effective date of the plan, the reorganized debtor 
proceeds without any court supervision, trustee administration, or wage 
garnishment orders, which are among those benefits ostensibly afforded 
to lenders under chapter 13. 
The plurality likewise rejected the “presumptive contract rate” and 
“cost of funds” approaches, concluding that those methods were less 
“objective” because they focused on something other than the debtor’s 
proposed payment stream.110 Similarly, the plurality recognized that 
those methods imposed evidentiary burdens on chapter 13 debtors who 
generally could not afford to bear them and would therefore be unfairly 
disadvantaged at trial.111 Such a concern does not typically arise in 
chapter 11. If a chapter 11 debtor’s business is sufficiently viable to 
discuss multi-year repayment terms, that almost invariably means 
operation of the business during the chapter 11 case has generated 
sufficient funds to cover the fees of counsel and often a valuation expert 
or financial advisor. Indeed, to confirm a chapter 11 plan at all, the 
debtor must show the court it can pay all such administration 
expenses.112 
Conversely, the plurality found that the “prime-plus” formula “has 
none of [the other methods’] defects.”113 It stated that the “prime-plus” 
approach takes “its cue from ordinary lending practices” because it starts 
with the “prime rate,” which is in the newspaper every day.114 Once a 
risk adjustment factor is added, “the resulting ‘prime plus’ rate of 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Till, 541 U.S. at 477. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 479. 
 111. See id. (“[T]he formula approach . . . minimizes the need for potentially costly 
additional evidentiary proceedings.”). 
 112. § 1129 (a)(9)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 113. Till, 541 U.S. at 478. 
 114. Id. at 478–79. 
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interest depends only on the state of financial markets, the 
circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the 
loan, not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions with the 
debtor. For these reasons, the prime-plus or formula rate best comports 
with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”115 Justice Thomas, who 
provided the fifth vote, joined the plurality because the “prime-plus” 
approach came closest to his view that the correct rate be totally devoid 
of any risk factor at all.116 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 479–80. 
 116. Justice Thomas’s concurrence states that the statute requires the “property” to 
be distributed under the plan to be valued rather than the debtor’s “promise” to 
distribute said property. See id. at 485–487 (Thomas, J., concurring). He asserts, 
without any detailed explanation of how he reaches his conclusion, that this means that 
the only discounting needed is at the risk-free rate, because otherwise, the bankruptcy 
court would be valuing the “promise.” See id. In other words, he assumes that only a 
risk-free rate values the “property,” i.e., the cash that will be received in the future. See 
id. at 486–87. While it may be correct to observe that the other justices are valuing the 
debtor’s “promise to deliver property under the plan,” it can be plausibly argued that 
Justice Thomas’s approach likewise values a promise. See id. at 485–90. It cannot value 
“the property to be distributed under the plan” because no one at plan confirmation 
knows exactly how much actually will be distributed, so even his approach values “the 
property promised to be delivered under the plan.” See id. Stated differently, Justice 
Thomas’s approach suggests valuing the promise at 100% probability of performance 
whereas the others are assigning some lower prospect. See id. Even within the literalist 
framework, one may just as easily conclude that the directive to the bankruptcy court to 
value what is “to be distributed” calls for the bankruptcy court to take into account, not 
merely what the plan says on paper is going to be distributed, but also the risk that what 
is supposed “to be distributed” does not actually turn out to be distributed. The statute 
does not explicitly say “property that is supposed to be distributed under the plan”; 
rather, it just refers to what is “to be distributed.” See id. at 487 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).  
  As a policy matter, if Justice Thomas’s interpretation were extended into the 
chapter 11 context, companies in Chapter 11 would be entitled to turn crammed-down 
debt into bonds with interest at the rate the U.S. Treasury pays on its 30-year bonds. As 
a consequence, such companies would be much more likely to reduce their debt as little 
as possible in the reorganization, since they could cram down the cheapest capital 
possible. Moreover, it would raise the question of why Congress bothered to provide for 
disclosure and voting by secured creditors in chapter 11 if a non-consensual approach 
was capable of producing only a risk-free rate. Finally, since the Bankruptcy Code does 
not require insolvency as a prerequisite for filing a chapter 11 case or proposing a plan, 
Justice Thomas’s interpretation would invite companies to resort frequently and 
liberally to chapter 11 just to re-price their debt downward in a falling rate environment. 
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IV. (MIS)APPLICATIONS OF TILL IN CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWNS 
Notwithstanding the absence in Till of any endorsement of a 
parallel between the chapter 13 and chapter 11 present value tests, a 
number of bankruptcy decisions in Till’s wake have nonetheless 
extended Till’s formula approach to chapter 11 cases.117 Some scholars 
and lower courts have taken the “same approach” dictum or Footnote 14 
to suggest that Till’s “prime-plus” method should determine cramdown 
rates in chapter 11. In the ten years since Till was decided, a clear 
consensus among the lower courts as to whether and how Till applies in 
chapter 11 cramdowns has yet to form.118 Some courts decline to apply 
Till,119 but those that embrace it follow one of two approaches. 
A. AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT’S TWO-STEP INQUIRY 
First, several courts have adopted the “two step inquiry” of the 
Sixth Circuit in In re American HomePatient, Inc.120 In that case the 
court construed the plurality’s Footnote 14 dictum to mean that the Till 
Court’s formula approach applies to chapter 11 cramdowns when no 
“efficient market” exists.121 American HomePatient elevated that dictum 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See, e.g., In re GAC Storage Lansing, LLC, 485 B.R. 174, 193 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2013); In re Moultonborough Hotel Grp., LLC, No. 10-14214-JMD, 2012 WL 
5464630, at *6–9 (Bankr. D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2012) (applying formula approach where no 
efficient market exists); In re Riverbend Leasing LLC, 458 B.R. 520, 535 (Bankr. S.D. 
Iowa 2011) (applying formula approach where no efficient market exists); see also In re 
G-I Holdings Inc., 420 B.R. 216, 239 (D.N.J. 2009) (endorsing a formula approach that 
begins with LIBOR); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 
2319201 at *11–12 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2005) (endorsing a formula approach 
that begins with the 10-year Treasury rate). 
 118. For a useful summary of the state of the law after Till, see Louis E. Robichaux 
IV, Russell A. Perry, Jonathan L. Howell, Till in Chapter 11 Cases and the Looming 
“Efficient Market” Debate, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2013). 
 119. See, e.g., In re Linda Vista Cinemas, L.L.C., 442 B.R. 724, 749 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 2010) (market approach); In re DBSD. N. Am., Inc., 419 BR 179, 209 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (preferring 
contract or comparable loan approach); In re Valencia Flour Mill, Ltd., 348 B.R. 573, 
578–79 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) (contract rate; declining Till’s prime-plus); In re Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 356 BR 239, 256 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (market rate). 
 120. See In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 121. Id. at 568 (“[W]e opt to take our cue from Footnote 14 of the opinion, which 
offered the guiding principle that ‘when picking a cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case, 
it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.’ Till, 541 U.S. 
at 476 n. 14, 124 S.Ct. 1951. This means that the market rate should be applied in 
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to a rule of law: first, the court should determine whether the lending 
market is “efficient”; if it is not, the court should apply Till’s “prime-
plus” formula.122 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has 
likewise affirmed the application of Till’s “prime-plus” method in the 
absence of an “efficient market,” and other courts have accepted this 
method as well.123 
The only other circuit court opinion addressing this issue in chapter 
11 bankruptcies is In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, L.L.C.124 In that 
case, the debtor and the secured lender stipulated that Till controlled.125 
The debtor’s expert argued for the prime rate plus a 1.75% risk premium 
to account for “the factors enumerated by the Till plurality,” including 
the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, the nature of the security, 
and the feasibility of the plan.126 The creditor’s expert, in contrast, 
argued for a “blended market rate” approach consisting of: first, the 
prime rate plus a premium so great the resultant rate equaled the 
weighted average of the rates the market would charge for an equivalent 
exit financing package and, second, a discount for the circumstances of 
the estate and the plan’s feasibility.127 The bankruptcy court adopted the 
debtor’s proposed rate.128 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit criticized the 
creditor’s approach as amounting to an effective choice of “the market 
rate, and not the prime rate, as the starting point”129 contrary to the 
stipulation to follow Till’s “prime-plus” formula. It then affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s adoption of the debtor’s “prime-plus” method, which 
the court could not find to be “clearly erroneous” because the approach 
was “endorsed by a plurality of the Supreme Court, adopted by the vast 
majority of bankruptcy courts, and, perhaps most importantly, accepted 
                                                                                                                 
Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market 
exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula 
approach endorsed by the Till plurality. This nuanced approach should obviate the 
concern of commentators who argue that, even in the Chapter 11 context, there are 
instances where no efficient market exists.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., In re VDG Chicken, LLC, No. NV-10-1278-HKiD, 2011 WL 
3299089, at *8-9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011). 
 124. See In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324 (5th              
Cir. 2013). 
 125. Id. at 327. 
 126. Id. at 334. 
 127. See id. at 335. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 335 n.57. 
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as governing by both parties.”130 Notably, the Fifth Circuit concluded its 
opinion by stating that its holding should not be taken to suggest that the 
“prime-plus” formula is “the only—or even the optimal—method for 
calculating the chapter 11 cramdown rate.”131 
The American HomePatient line of cases is flawed for two reasons. 
First, bankruptcy courts have no particular competence in determining 
whether markets are efficient. It is ironic that Till, which called market 
analysis “an inquiry far removed from such courts’ usual task[s],”132 
would be construed to instruct those same courts to engage in the kind 
of market analysis usually conducted by the Department of Justice or the 
Federal Trade Commission. Second, courts have inexplicably allowed 
debtors to define the criterion of efficiency to be whether the debtor can 
get the terms the debtor wants in the market (a “did-Santa-bring-you-
everything-on-your-list” approach).133 This perversely incentivizes 
debtors to propose wildly off-market loan terms, causing the market to 
look inefficient and thereby inducing the judge to approve the proposed 
cramdown rate based on currently low prime rates and a below-market 
risk premium. 
For instance, in Texas Grand Prairie, the debtor’s expert had 
testified that average terms for loans to similar hotels in 2010 included a 
loan-to-value ratio of 58%, an interest rate of 7.9%, and a debt-coverage 
ratio (net operating income divided by debt service) of 1.5,134 none of 
which came close to the terms of the proposed plan. He nonetheless 
disregarded the market “because he believed that the market for hotel 
and hospitality loans generally was not an efficient market,” a 
conclusion which cleared the way for the debtor’s proposed cramdown 
rate, which was only 5%.135 
A particularly egregious example of a debtor proposing off-market 
repayment terms to elicit a finding that the loan market is not efficient is 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 337. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004). 
 133. While a discussion of what is, or is not, an “efficient market” is well beyond 
the scope of this article, it is safe to say that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a single 
market participant is not considered to be a sufficient datum by which to gauge a 
market’s efficiency. 
 134. Brief of Appellant at 18, In re Tex. Grand Prairie, 710 F.3d 324 (No. 11-
11109), 2012 WL 1197681. 
 135. Id. at 20-22. 
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In re Castleton Plaza.136 There, the debtor, which owned a shopping 
center, proposed a plan that left a loan-to-value ratio of approximately 
97% and provided for repayment of the balance of the mortgage over 10 
years based on a 30-year amortization schedule.137 The bankruptcy court 
presented its “efficient market analysis” in a single sentence, stating: 
“There is not an efficient market in which a loan can be obtained for 
more than 97% of the value of a shopping center with an occupancy rate 
of less than 70% . . . .”138 Instead of realizing the market was behaving 
rationally not to lend that much against a property that was thirty percent 
vacant, the court endorsed the debtor’s proposed prime-plus 3% rate. 
The American HomePatient formulation of Footnote 14 defies 
common sense. Instead of inferring from the fact that “the market would 
not make the loan on the terms proposed” that the terms were not “fair” 
and “equitable” to the creditor, American HomePatient’s “nuanced 
approach” has led courts to assume that the terms are fair and equitable 
and the market is simply inefficient precisely because it will not support 
those terms. Thus, although a proper recognition of the depth and 
efficiency of U.S. capital markets may bring the American HomePatient 
approach more or less into line with the absolute priority rule, the 
implementation of the approach has been seriously flawed.139 The 
approach is reminiscent of the reasoning of the debtor’s expert in Till 
who opined that the prime-plus rate of 9.5% was “very reasonable” 
given that chapter 13 plans are “supposed to be financially feasible.”140 
Such reasoning may be accepted in the chapter 13 context, but it has 
never been accepted as satisfying chapter 11’s established “fair and 
equitable” standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) (vacating and 
remanding confirmation order on other grounds). 
 137. Id. at 822. On remand, the bankruptcy judge dismissed after giving debtor 
multiple opportunities to modify the plan. Order Granting EL-SNPR Notes Holdings, 
LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), In re Castleton Plaza, LP, 
Case No. 11-01444-BHL (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2014). The Debtor appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit; the case has been fully briefed and argued as of April 22, 2015. 
 138. Order Confirming the Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at 9, In re Castleton 
Plaza, LP, Case No. 11-01444-BHL (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 31, 2012). 
 139. While the definition of an “efficient market” is a vigorously debated and 
studied topic in academics, there is absolutely zero support for a thesis that the 
efficiency of a market is measured by whether one would-be participant is satisfied with 
the range of offers the market affords that participant. 
 140. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 471-72 (2004) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
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B. MOMENTIVE PERFORMANCE MATERIALS 
A second, more radical approach has been to impose the “prime-
plus” method without any analysis of the market’s efficiency. The 
decision in In re Momentive Performance Materials exemplified this 
approach.141 The Momentive court declared as a “first principle” that 
“the cramdown interest rate, under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), should 
not contain any profit or cost element.”142 For this proposition, the court 
cited Till (which, as discussed infra, itself cited no authority for this 
proposition) as well as another chapter 13 case within the Second 
Circuit, In re Valenti.143 The court also addressed Footnote 14 and its 
dictum that “it might make sense to look at what rate an efficient market 
might produce.” The court explained that Footnote 14’s reference to 
debtor-in-possession financing (the extension of funds to a debtor in 
bankruptcy) betrayed a mistaken understanding of those loans and 
undermined the footnote’s persuasive value. It said that “[l]oans 
imposed at confirmation resemble more traditional exit or long-term 
financing than interim debtor-in-possession financing,” and, given this 
fact, Footnote 14 could not have been referencing cramdown loans.144 
The Momentive court further concluded that other courts’ emphasis 
on whether an efficient market exists is misplaced, noting that “there 
clearly was some form of market… in the Till case.”145 Moreover, it 
contended that the presence or absence of a perfect market was not the 
driving factor of the Till Court’s decision, as evidenced by the fact that 
the plurality “again referred to a perfectly competitive market.”146 
Rather, according to the Momentive court, what drove the Till decision 
was “an interest rate that takes the profit out, takes the fees out, and 
compensates the creditor under a formula starting with a base rate, that 
is essentially riskless, plus up to a 1 to 3 percent additional risk 
premium, if any, at least as against the prime rate, for the debtor’s own 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, No. 14-cv-07471-vb, 2015 WL 2330761 (S.D.N.Y. May 
4, 2015); see also In re G-I Holdings Inc., 420 BR 216, 267 (D.N.J. 2009) (preferring to 
start with LIBOR); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 
2319201 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2005) (preferring 10-year US treasury rate). 
 142. In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, at *26. 
 143. Id. at *24; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997) does not mention chapter 
11 or § 1129 at all. 
 144. In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, at *27. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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unique risks . . . coming out of bankruptcy.”147 Thus, the Momentive 
decision aptly discredits the American HomePatient approach in its 
interpretation of Footnote 14’s reference to efficient markets, but it does 
not go on to hold that Till does not apply to chapter 11 cases. Rather, the 
Momentive decision is premised on the assertion that the chapter 13 
present value test is “closely analogous to other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, including 1129(b)(2),” and it invokes the Till “same 
approach” dictum to justify the analogy.148 Ultimately, the court in 
Momentive used the “prime-plus” approach—the “same approach” used 
in Till and Valenti—to determine the cramdown interest rate for the 
secured claims.149 
The Momentive court’s novel claim that profit has no place in the 
chapter 11 present value test conflicts with Supreme Court decisions 
upholding the absolute priority rule. For example, in Reconstruction 
Finance Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., the plan 
confirmed by the lower court in 1943, in the midst of World War II, 
awarded first lien creditors new restructured secured debt instruments 
and stock amounting to 90% of the reorganized debtor’s equity; the 
second liens received only the remaining 10% of the equity.150 Several 
appeals were taken from confirmation by junior interests, principally 
arguing that the first liens were being overcompensated. The second lien 
holders’ reasoning was that the underlying business valuation had failed 
to account for the “excess war profits” the railroad would reap during 
the war after the effective date, 90% of which would flow to the first 
lien holders through their newly-awarded common stock.151 The 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. at 28. 
 148. Id. at 24 (“‘Congress likely intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow 
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of 
the many Code provisions requiring a court to discount a stream of deferred payments 
back to their present dollar value.’”) (citing Till, 541 8 U.S. at 466). 
 149. See id. at 29. The Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court held that 
Valenti, the pre-Till Second Circuit chapter 13 decision that adopted the prime-plus 
approach, was controlling. Id. 
 150. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 502 n.6 
(Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 502 n.6 (1946). 
The decision was approved by the lower court, but the Circuit Court held that the 
General bondholders were “reasonably justified” in rejecting the plan because, among 
other reasons, “free cash in excess of operating capital needs and large earnings from 
war business after the date of the plan should be for the benefit of the General 
bondholders.” Id. at 531. 
 151.  Id. at 521. 
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appellate court agreed that the secured creditors were over-compensated 
by the debtor’s plan.152 In a seven to one ruling, the Supreme Court 
reversed the circuit court, reinstated the confirmation of the plan, and 
justified the award of “unlimited profits” to the first lien holders as 
necessary to achieve full compensation under the “fair and equitable” 
standard.153 In a section of the opinion titled “Cash and War Earnings,” 
the Court noted that the Interstate Commerce Commission154 had 
justified the plan’s departure from full cash equivalency for the first 
liens by the fact that the senior secured bondholders would receive 90% 
of the common stock and thereby participate in the “excess war 
profits.”155 The Supreme Court wrote that “the error of the Circuit    
Court . . . lies in its assumption that the senior bondholders were paid in 
full by the securities allotted to them without also accepting the 
determination of the Commission . . . [that] all subsequent earnings were 
a part also of the common stock that was awarded the senior 
bondholders,”156 and the “fair and equitable” principle entitled the 
creditors to potentially “unlimited dividends that might be earned and 
paid on the common stock to have a part in the ‘lush years.’”157 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 520. The Circuit Court of Appeals had stated: “The senior bondholders 
were paid in full. They received all the new securities and most of the common stock. 
Ninety percent of the General Bondholders’ claims were wiped out. They received only 
a small amount of common stock, ten per cent of their total claim. . . . We think any 
plan which fails to take this [buildup of huge retained earnings during WWII] into 
account and which gives the Senior Bondholders their claims in full by substantially 
delivering the road to them, and gives them the surplus cash actually on hand and 
further enables them to receive in addition the excess war profits which are reasonably 
sure to come, is inherently inequitable and unfair, so long as there are classes of 
creditors whose claims are not fully satisfied.” Id. at 520–21. Such reasoning is much 
the same as that deployed by the plurality in Till and by lower courts like the Second 
Circuit in Valenti, each of which concluded that creditors are “overcompensated” if 
they make a profit. 
 153. See id. at 533 (“The grounds accepted by us in former sections of this opinion 
as sustaining, as of January 1, 1943, the valuation of the road, the allocation of the 
securities, and the treatment of cash, war earnings and capital reductions establish that 
for the act of confirmation on November 29, 1944, over the objection of the General 
bondholders, the finding of the judge that the plan then made ‘adequate provision for 
fair and equitable treatment’ of the dissenters was justified.”). 
 154. The Interstate Commerce Commission was a regulatory agency created by 
Congress to regulate railroads’ compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. 
 155. Id. at 520–21. 
 156. Id. at 523–24. 
 157. Id. at 518. 
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In a follow-up case the next year, the Court succinctly summarized 
its holding: 
To justify the change of position of creditors from fully secured to 
partially secured, creditors were given opportunities to participate in 
profits through common stock ownership with a chance at larger 
earnings than the Commission’s forecast anticipated. We held the 
priority rule was satisfied by this type of allocation.158 
In that second case, Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & 
R.G.W.R. Co., the issue posed to the Court was remarkably similar to the 
one the Tills would present nearly 60 years later: whether the secured 
creditors would receive interest rates that were simply too high to be 
“fair and equitable.” In contrast with the Till Court’s rejection of market 
inquiries in chapter 13 cases, the 1947 Court—in the business 
reorganization context—had the opposite perspective. It cited bond 
market data from Moody’s showing that the first lien bonds had traded 
in the 102.89 to 103.82 range during 1945 and 1946 but, in 1947, had 
traded below 90. The Court concluded that “[u]ntil it can be contended 
with some show of reasonableness that the [senior creditors] have 
received more in value than the face of their claims, the debtor’s 
insistence on a re-examination of the plan is without substantial 
support.”159 In short, the Court in both Reconstruction Finance Corp. 
and Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. recognized 
that secured creditors may receive potentially unlimited profits in order 
to satisfy the “fair and equitable” standard, and market evidence is 
certainly relevant to evaluating whether packages of securities satisfy 
the “fair and equitable” standard. 
This was the understanding when the Bankruptcy Code was 
adopted in 1978. The House Judiciary Committee staff member who led 
its drafting wrote that “[t]he discount rate is equivalent to the rate of 
interest that would be paid on an obligation of the debtor considering a 
market rate of interest that reflects the risk of the debtor’s business.”160 
In giving a numerical example of the computation, he employed 
illustrative discount rates of 20% and 25%—at a time when the risk-free 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Ins. Grp. Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 329 U.S. 607, 617 (1947) 
(emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 588 (citations omitted). 
 160. See Klee, supra note 28, at 158. 
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rate was roughly half of those rates.161 Similarly, Momentive makes no 
mention of 203 North LaSalle, even though that case construed the 
chapter 11 provision in question just five years before Till and posited 
that a “market test” should be conducted before an equity contribution 
from existing owners would satisfy the “fair and equitable” requirement. 
Thus, the assertion in Momentive that profit has no place in 
calculating chapter 11 cramdown rates contravenes the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on this very point. Neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court has plausibly indicated that chapter 11 cramdown rates should be 
stripped of the profit element. Both the American HomePatient and 
Momentive lines of cases conflict with the century-old line of Supreme 
Court precedents in the business reorganization context requiring, 
pursuant to the “fair and equitable” requirement, that secured creditors 
recover payment in full before junior constituencies participate in the 
reorganization. We doubt that the two casual remarks of the plurality 
that have been seized upon by lower courts (Footnote 14 and the “same 
approach” remark) were intended to overrule those precedents, 
especially in the absence of any briefing, argument, or explanation on 
the record to that effect. 
V. COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE CHAPTER 11 CRAMDOWN RATES BASED 
ON SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 
CASES 
Having walked through the briefs, argument, and plurality opinion 
of Till, and having examined the two groups of lower court decisions 
adopting it in chapter 11, we circle back to this article’s starting point. 
The phrase “fair and equitable”––judicially developed over the past 
century in at least half a dozen Supreme Court opinions and codified 
with its attendant judicial gloss in section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code –– requires that senior creditors be paid in full, or “made whole,” 
with due regard for the evidentiary value of market information and 
without a moralistic bias against profit-making. In contrast, the phrase 
“fair and equitable” is absent from chapter 13 jurisprudence because the 
phrase “fair and equitable” simply does not appear anywhere in chapter 
13. The absence of this concept renders present value approaches        
for cramdown purposes qualitatively different in chapter 13 versus 
chapter 11. 
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A. CHAPTER 11 VERSUS CHAPTER 13: THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
DIFFERS MEANINGFULLY 
Lower courts applying Till have failed to appreciate the differences 
between sections 1129 and 1325. Specifically, they have failed to 
recognize that the former expressly incorporates the “fair and equitable” 
standard and the latter utterly omits it. Even though section 1129’s 
“deferred payment” condition and section 1325’s “deferred payment” 
condition each require very similar present value tests, the statutory 
contexts in which each present value test resides have meaningful 
differences. 
The chapter 11 present value test appears in a clause that is 
subordinate to the well-developed phrase “fair and equitable.” 
1129(b)(2) states: 
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair 
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following 
requirements: 
(A)With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides— 
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens 
securing such claims, whether the property subject to such 
liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another 
entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; 
and 
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on 
account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at 
least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such 
holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.162 
The condition that a plan be “fair and equitable” “includes,” as one 
of three alternatives, that a secured claimholder receive deferred cash 
payments.163 The implication of Congress’s use of the word “includes” 
is that “technical compliance with the requirements of section 
1129(b)(2) will not insure that a plan will be crammed down if it is 
unfair and inequitable for some other reason,” such as that senior 
                                                                                                                 
 162. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
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creditors are not paid in full while junior creditors receive value.164 In 
other words, the statute does not limit assessment of what is “fair and 
equitable” to only those criteria explicitly listed in the Code; other 
considerations, including those treated by existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, must likewise be assessed under the current Code. 
The statute commands that the plan’s treatment of a dissenting class 
must be “fair and equitable,” and it is merely a subordinate clause that 
allows deferred cash payments to be used as long as they deliver full 
present value. The conscious choice to locate “fair and equitable” in the 
main clause, especially in light of Los Angeles Lumber’s express 
declaration that the incorporation of the phrase in prior laws endorsed 
the Supreme Court’s interpretations of it,165 signals that Congress 
intended the well-developed standard to govern the application of the 
subordinate clauses. A contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with 
the dominant/subordinate relationship and would effectively read the 
phrase, and its century of judicial affirmation, out of the Code. Had 
Congress wanted to free plans of reorganization from the absolute 
priority standard, it would have simply omitted “fair and equitable” 
entirely and jumped directly to the subordinate clause. 
That is exactly the approach Congress took in drafting chapter 13. 
Chapter 13 does not incorporate the “fair and equitable” standard in any 
way. It gets directly to the present value test. Section 1325(a)(5) states: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a 
plan if . . . 
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for 
by the plan . . . 
(B)(i) the plan provides that . . . 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
of property to be distributed under the plan on 
account of such claim is not less than the allowed 
amount of such claim . . . . 
Consistent with our prior analysis of section 1129(b)(2)(A), by its 
omission of “fair and equitable” from chapter 13, Congress signaled that 
the chapter 13 present value test was to be interpreted without regard to 
the absolute priority rule. 
                                                                                                                 
 164. GERBER, supra note 25, at 729. 
 165. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939). 
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This contrast provides a coherent framework within which to locate 
Till. Chapter 11 uses the phrase “fair and equitable”; chapter 13 does 
not. Thus, chapter 11 cramdown analysis has to fit within the parameters 
established by a century of Supreme Court decisions, which require 
creditors to be “made whole” economically, but chapter 13 is free of that 
requirement. 
Till can thus stand on its own as a chapter 13 decision, separate and 
apart from the business reorganization precedents it never mentions. But 
conversely, it is those decisions, not Till, that courts should be turning to 
when they confront cramdown proposals in chapter 11 reorganizations. 
Courts applying Till in chapter 11 cramdowns are supervening 
Congress’s intent that the absolute priority rule be satisfied in chapter 
11, as well as the fact that the Court has written numerous times—from 
Boyd to 203 LaSalle—that section 1129’s “fair and equitable” standard 
includes the absolute priority doctrine. 
B. MAKING SENSE OF TILL’S CHAPTER 11 DICTA 
This statutory framework also provides a coherent explanation of 
the dicta in Till concerning chapter 11—the “same approach” remark 
and Footnote 14. In Till, the plurality’s remark that Congress “likely” 
intended courts to use “essentially the same approach when choosing an 
interest rate” to discount payment streams to present value throughout 
the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate that courts use the exact same 
method of calculating present value in every chapter.166 Rather, the 
“same approach” dictum is better interpreted to say that courts should 
adopt a present value method that comports with the statutory 
particularities and administrative realities of the cramdown provision of 
the chapter in question, as it did in Till. This is apparent in the decision 
itself: on the very next page following the “same approach” remark, the 
Court’s Footnote 14 suggests outright that chapter 11 cramdowns should 
be handled differently than chapter 13 cramdowns by reference to “the 
rate an efficient market would produce.”167 Footnote 14 then continues 
by stating that, “in the Chapter 13 context, by contrast, the absence of 
any such market obligates courts to look to first principles and ask only 
what rate will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure.”168 By 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2004). 
 167. Id. at 476 n.14. 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
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contrasting cramdown under the two chapters, the plurality implicitly 
adopts a perspective similar to the framework proposed in this article 
that differentiates consumer bankruptcies from business reorganizations. 
Such a framework allows greater flexibility in consumer bankruptcies, 
while upholding Congress’s intention that chapter 11 cramdowns be 
based upon the “fair and equitable” standard and the century of 
precedents thereunder. 
The Till plurality’s omission of any treatment of the “fair and 
equitable” phrase can be interpreted as affording more leeway to chapter 
13 plan terms in concordance with the implication of the statutory 
scheme that chapter 13 was designed with individual debtor 
rehabilitation, and not creditor protection, in mind. This is consistent 
with the fact that section 1325 omits the “fair and equitable” 
requirement and thus is free from the lengthy line of cases that construe 
“fair and equitable” as mandating application of the absolute priority 
rule. Given the history, the relevant statutory schemes, and the 
peculiarities of the Till decision, the most informed way to reconcile the 
plurality’s “same approach” remark with existing precedent and the 
language of the Code is to interpret the chapter 11 cramdown provision 
in the context of the “fair and equitable” precedents rather than 
mandating use of the formula method. Meanwhile, the present value 
language in chapter 13 should be interpreted in light of Till and the 
specific administrative challenges of chapter 13 cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the implication of the decisions trending in the lower 
courts, the Till plurality’s dicta was never intended to transform 
cramdown standards in chapter 11. The proceedings in Till were so 
focused on practical concerns unique to chapter 13 scenarios that its 
reasoning should not be invoked elsewhere.169 The dicta on which the 
Momentive and American HomePatient lines of cases rely do not 
mandate application of Till to chapter 11, and, in fact,170 the “efficient 
market” remark in Till’s Footnote 14 serves to underscore the Court’s 
recognition that there are more differences than similarities between 
chapter 13 and chapter 11 cramdowns.171 
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Courts should therefore take their lead from those Supreme Court 
decisions that bear directly upon chapter 11 cramdowns. Those 
decisions mandate adherence to the absolute priority doctrine and strict 
application of the “fair and equitable” standard, both of which afford 
protections to chapter 11 secured creditors that are not afforded to their 
counterparts in chapter 13 consumer bankruptcies.” 
